Firm-level investment is lumpy and volatile but aggregate investment is much smoother and highly serially correlated. This di¤erent patterns of investment behavior has been viewed as indicating convex adjustment costs at the aggregate level but non-convex adjustment costs at the …rm level. This paper shows that …nancial frictions in the form of collateralized borrowing at the …rm level (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1998) can give rise to convex adjustment costs at the aggregate level, yet at the same time generate lumpiness in plant-level investment. In particular, our model can (i) derive aggregate capital adjustment cost functions that are identical to those assumed by Hayashi (1982) and (ii) explain the weak empirical relationship between Tobin's Q and plant-level investment. However, despite that aggregate adjustment cost functions can be derived from microfoundations, they are subject to the Lucas critique because parameters in such functions may not be structural and policy-invariant.
Introduction
It is well known that …rm-level investment behaves quite di¤erently from aggregate investment. In particular, …rm-level investment is lumpy whereas aggregate investment is much smoother and highly serially correlated (see, e.g., Caballero, 1999) . Such a sharp di¤erence in investment dynamics at the plant and aggregate level has often motivated researchers to adopt inconsistent assumptions in explaining investment dynamics: assuming convex adjustment costs in aggregate models and non-convex adjustment costs in micro models. Econometric studies typically …nd that convex capital adjustment costs (CAC) are consistent with aggregate investment data, but not with …rm-level data (e.g., Bloom, 2009 ).
However, CAC are a widely adopted assumption in dynamic macroeconomic models and have a long tradition in the history of investment theory. 1 This assumption is often needed because a theoretical model without CAC would imply (i) the elasticity of capital supply is the same in both the short run and the long run, i.e., the equilibrium capital stock can be reached instantaneously because of the possibility of an in…nite speed of investment rate; and
(ii) the relative price of the investment and consumption goods is a constant independent of the relative outputs of the two goods.
Such implications not only are inconsistent with data but also create theoretical di¢ culties to determine the optimal rate of investment in partial equilibrium models of the …rm, which has motivated the early investment literature to adopt CAC (e.g., Lucas, 1967; Gould, 1968 ). In addition, theory requires CAC to rationalize investment decisions as a function of …rm value and replacement costs of capital (Tobin, 1969; Lucas and Prescott, 1971; Hayashi, 1982 ). 2 CAC also play an important role in contemporary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models because (i) it signi…cantly improves the empirical …t of DSGE models with sticky prices (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005; Smets and Wouters, 2003);
(ii) it is helpful for open-economy models to explain the saving-investment correlations and the home bias puzzle (e.g., Baxter and Crucini 1993); (iii) it is essential to explain the equity premium puzzle in production economies with capital (e.g., Jermann, 1998; Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher, 2001 ); (iv) it rationalizes big welfare costs of the business cycle (e.g., Barlevy 2004 ); and (v) it is key to support news shocks as a credible driving force of the business cycle (e.g., Beaudry and Portier, 2007 ; Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2009 ).
However, despite the popularity and apparent "necessity" of CAC in macro models, few microfoundations have been provided in the literature to rationalize CAC, especially the properties imposed on the functional forms of CAC (Hayashi, 1982) . This lack of microfoundations unavoidably invites criticisms, such as (i) empirical analysis based on …rm-level data does not …nd convex adjustment costs important in explaining …rm-level investment behavior; 3 (ii) …rm-level investment is lumpy with very little serial correlation, which is inconsistent with convex adjustment costs that smooth out investment over time; 4 (iii) CAC implies that Tobin's Q should be a su¢ cient statistics to explain …rm-level investment, but …rms'investments are far more sensitive to cash ‡ows than to Tobin's Q.
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(iv) capital adjustment costs are not observed or recorded in national income accounts, nor in …rms'balance sheets. The goal of this paper is to provide a reconciliation for the apparent inconsistence between micro and macro behaviors of investment. In particular, we show that …nancial frictions in the form of collateralized borrowing at the …rm level can explain convex adjustment costs at the aggregate level and lumpy investment at the …rm level.
The typical CAC models assume the following functional form (Hayashi, 1982) :
where the function ( ) is increasing, concave, and homogeneous of degree zero, K t denotes the existing capital stock, and I t denotes total investment expenditure as part of a …rm's cash ‡ow (CF ): CF = F (K; N ) W N P I, where P is the relative price of investment goods.
In a one-good economy, P = 1. This type of CAC function ( ) implies diminishing returns to investment in capital formation-i.e., part of the investment spending is lost and does not become productive capital. Under this type of adjustment cost function, the average Tobin's Q is the same as the marginal Q, which greatly facilitates empirical studies of investment behaviors (Hayashi, 1982) . 3 See e.g, Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and Bloom (2009) . 4 See, e.g., Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995) , Cooper, Haltiwanger and Power (1999) , Doms and Dunne (1998) , and Power (1994) . 5 See, e.g., Hassett and Hubbard (1997) and Caballero (1999) .
This form of adjustment costs in equation (1) is equivalent to an alternative formulation of CAC that is also popular in the investment literature. This alternative formulation maintains the neoclassical law of motion for capital, K t+1 = (1 ) K t +Ĩ t , but rede…nes a …rms'cash ‡ow as
where the function C( ) denotes total real costs associated with investment expenditureĨ t measured in capital units and satis…es the properties C 0 ( ) > 0, and C 00 ( ) > 0 (see, e.g., Abel, 1982 Abel, , 1983 ).
These two forms of adjustment costs formulated in equations (1) and (2) are equivalent, since by rede…ning (ii) Capital is …rm speci…c, which makes investment irreversible or partially irreversible (i.e., with resale costs). Irreversibility imposes costs in adjusting the capital stock downward. (iii)
Firms are borrowing constrained; hence, they are not able to increase capital at an in…nite speed. Borrowing constraints impose costs on adjusting capital upward.
However, two questions naturally arise: Suppose these frictions are explicitly modeled in …rms' optimization decisions, (i) would they necessarily give rise to the form of CAC in equation (1) These questions are answered in this paper. We show that (i) If …rms'investment projects are subject to idiosyncratic risk (that a¤ects the project's rate of returns) and …rms face borrowing constraints with borrowing limit proportional to …rm's collateral (capital stock), then the aggregate economy exhibits CAC that is identical in functional form to equation (1) .
(ii) Irreversible investment-an important assumption in the investment literature to rationalize convex adjustment costs 6 -is unnecessary for deriving the aggregate CAC function but imposes more structures on the aggregate CAC function. In particular, if investment is 6 See, e.g., Eberly (1994, 1996) , Pindyck (1991) , Dixit (1992) , and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) .
completely irreversible and the distribution of investment-speci…c shocks follow the Pareto distribution, then the implied aggregate CAC function becomes the popular Cobb-Douglas form:
where 2 (0; 1) is a parameter that depends on the borrowing constraints and distribution of …rm-speci…c shocks.
(iii) Although the aggregate CAC function in equation (1) 7 The theoretical literature on lumpy investment typically assumes …xed investment costs. Important examples include Veracierto (2002) , Thomas (2002) , Thomas (2003, 2008) , Gourio and Kashyap (2007) , Bachmann et al. (2008) , among others. from entrepreneur households who transform consumption goods into capital by borrowing from other unproductive households. In contrast, …rms in our model own capital and they …nance investment projects by both internal cash ‡ows and external funds with borrowing limits depending on the …rm's collateral value. Thus, we can characterize the relationship between the marginal Q and average Q of a …rm, following closely the tradition of Tobin (1969) and Hayashi (1982) . (ii) In an agency-cost model, investment is not lumpy because the entrepreneurs always undertake invest in equilibrium. This feature is inconsistent with the data. In contrast, we attempt to quantitatively match the lumpiness of …rm-level investment and the correlation between investment rate and Tobin's Q. (iii) We also discuss the policy implications of CAC and show that standard CAC functions are subject to the Lucas critique.
Our work is also related to Lorenzoni and Walentin (2007) and the associated literature that uses simulated data from theoretical models with …nancial frictions to investigate the quantitative relationship between Tobin's Q and investment (e.g., Gomes, 2001 ; and others). Lorenzoni and Walentin (2007) show that …nancial constraints can substantially weaken the correlation between Q and investment, relative to a frictionless benchmark (e.g., Hayashi, 1982 ). While our model can also explain the weak relationship between Q and investment, our approach di¤ers from theirs in one important aspect: These authors assume CAC in …rm's investment technologies, whereas we do not need this assumption. Our paper also di¤ers from theirs in the main focus of the analysis: We try to rationalize and derive CAC from microfoundations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a benchmark model with a simple form of borrowing constraints and shows how to derive equation (1) 2 The Benchmark Model
Firms
There are a continuum of competitive …rms indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. Firm i's objective is to maximize its discounted dividends,
where D t represents …rm i's dividend in period t and t the marginal utility of a representative household. The production function has constant returns to scale and is given by
where A t represents aggregate labor-augmenting technology that can be either deterministic or stochastic, and N t (i) and K t (i) are …rm-level employment and capital, respectively. Each …rm accumulates capital according to the law of motion,
where I t (i) denotes investment expenditure and " t (i) 2 R + is an idiosyncratic shock to the marginal e¢ ciency of investment, which has the probability density function (") and cumulative density function ("). For simplicity, assume that this shock is orthogonal to any aggregate shocks. A …rm's dividend in period t is hence given by
, where P t = 1 denotes the relative price of investment goods and W t the competitive real wage.
Denote n t (i) N t (i)=K t (i) as the labor-capital ratio and f ( ) F (1; ) as the outputcapital ratio. Given the real wage, the …rm's optimal labor demand is determined by the equation, f n (A t n t (i)) A t = W t . Note that the labor demand function implies that all …rms choose the same labor-capital ratio, namely, n t (i) = n(w t ; A t ) for all i. Firm i's operating pro…ts can then be expressed as
is independent of i and the capital stock. Hence, …rm's operating pro…t is proportional to its capital stock. The dividend is then given by
We make the following additional assumptions:
(i) Firms'investment is …nanced by credit and is subject to the borrowing constraint:
where > 0 is a constant. This borrowing constraint speci…es that total investment cannot exceed an amount proportional to the existing capital stock. This is similar to the collateralized borrowing assumed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). We will make endogenous in the next section.
(ii) Firm-level investment may be partially irreversible:
where the parameter 2 [0; 1] indicates the degree of irreversibility. For example, if = 1, then investment is completely irreversible and equation (9) becomes I t (i) 0. On the other extreme, if = 0, then investment is completely reversible and equation (9) becomes
Hence, the restriction in equation (9) encompasses both reversible and irreversible investment as special cases. Equation (9) can also be rewritten as
where~ (1 ) (1 ). Since our general results hold for = 0, irreversible investment is not essential for our analysis.
With the de…nition in equation (7), a …rm's maximization problem can be rewritten as
subject to equations (6), (8), and (10).
Denote f t (i); t (i); t (i)g as the Lagrangian multipliers of constraints (6), (8), and (10), respectively, the …rm's …rst order conditions for {I t (i); K t+1 (i)} are given, respectively, by
plus the complementarity slackness conditions, t (i)
As shown by Wang and Wen (2009) in a similar model, in the case that " t (i) is i.i.d, the Lagrangian multipliers { t (i), t (i), t (i)} depend only on aggregate states S t and " t (i), which implies that the expected value of the Lagrangian multipliers are independent of i; namely, E t t+1 (i) = t+1 , E t t+1 (i) = t+1 , and E t t+1 (i) = t+1 . So equation (13) can be rewritten as
which shows that t (i) = (S t ) t is also independent of i. Since the marginal cost of investment is 1 and the marginal value of newly installed capital stock is t , the market-based measure of Tobin's Q is given by Q t = t , which is independent of i.
Investment Decision Rules
We use a guess-and-verify strategy to derive closed-form decision rules at the …rm level. The decision rules are characterized by a cuto¤ strategy where the cuto¤ (" t ) pertains to the realization of investment-speci…c shocks and is de…ned by the opportunity cost of installing one unit of capital:
Consider the following possible cases:
Case A: " t (i) > " t . In this case the marginal e¢ ciency of investment is high. Since the return to investment is high, …rms opt to undertake investment up to the borrowing limit,
. So the constraint (10) does not bind. Hence, we have t (i) = 0. By equation
Case B: " t (i) < " t . In this case the marginal e¢ ciency of investment is low. Since the return to investment is low, …rms opt to make minimum amount of investment. So we have
. So the constraint (8) does not bind and we have t (i) = 0. By equation
by the slackness condition we have I t (i) = ~
which leads to a contradiction. Hence, we must have t (i) = t (i) = 0. In this marginal case,
, which con…rms that the cuto¤ is indeed given by equation (15) . Without loss of generality, we assume that in this marginal case a …rm undertakes maximum invest.
Notice that from an individual …rm's own perspective, Tobin's Q is measured by q t (i)
. A …rm will undertake positive investment if q(i) 1, otherwise the …rm disinvest or remains inactive. However, because markets are incomplete and the idiosyncratic shocks are not observable (or insured) through markets, the market-based measure of Tobin's Q is
which is independent of " t (i).
Based on the above analysis, the Lagrangian multipliers satisfy t (i) = max fq t (i) 1; 0g
and t (i) = max f1 q t (i); 0g. The …rm's decision rules for investment and capital accumulation are given by
where the implicit function O( ) in the last equation is de…ned by
The investment function (16) indicates that …rm-level investment is lumpy and lacks serial correlations. Each …rm in any period has only probability 1 (" t ) to undertake positive investment and probability (" t ) to remain inactive (or disinvest). These probabilities are determined by aggregate economic conditions that in ‡uence the cuto¤ (" t ) and independent of each …rm's investment history (which is highly idiosyncratic). Also, such lumpiness is independent of the value of~ ; namely, the lumpiness does not hinge on irreversibility.
Notice that O( ) is the option value of one unit of installed capital: 8 If the …rm receives a favorable shock in the next period, one unit of installed capital can expand …rm's borrowing capacity by units and each additional unit can bring a net pro…t of q(i) 1 (=
units. This case happens with probability R
In the case of an unfavorable shock, the …rm can disinvest by~ 0 units and each unit of saving can be transform into
units of consumption goods. By doing so, the …rm can increase net pro…t by
Hence, equation (17) implies that the optimal level of investment is determined to the point where the marginal cost (
) equals the marginal bene…ts (= the marginal product of capital + the value of non-depreciated capital + the option value of capital). Because the optimal level of investment depends on the expected returns, which in turn depend on the probability weights of the di¤erent cases considered above (i.e., the cuto¤ " t ), equation (17) says that a …rm chooses the optimal cuto¤ " t (as an implicit function of aggregate economic conditions) so that the marginal cost of investment equals the expected marginal gains.
Equation (17) also shows that the optimal cuto¤ " t is independent of i, namely, it is the same across all …rms. This is the consequence of the assumption that "(i) is i.i.d. More speci…cally, the optimal cuto¤ is independent of …rms'investment rate and existing capital stock. This property enables us to characterize aggregate investment dynamics in a tractable manner without the need of using numerical methods (such as in Krusell and Smith, 1998).
Properties of Aggregate Investment Function
Integrating the …rm-level decision rules by the law of large numbers, the aggregate investment, aggregate capital stock, and the optimal cuto¤ are determined jointly by the following three equations:
and equation (17); where equation (19) is derived from equation (16) and equation (20) from equation (6) . It can be con…rmed by the eigenvalue method that this three-equation dynamic system has a unique saddle-path steady state. Hence, given the stochastic process of fR t ; t g, the equilibrium path of fI t ; K t+1 ; " t g is uniquely determined. Equation (19) suggests that the aggregate investment rate is fully determined by " t .
Given the parameters and~ , this equation also de…ne the cuto¤ as an implicit function of 9 See Wang and Wen (2009) for a general-equilibrium analysis of a similar model with a household sector.
the investment rate: " t = " (
It Kt
). Therefore, equation (20) can be written as
where
is an implicit function of aggregate investment rate.
Proposition 1
The implicit function '( ) is increasing, strictly concave, and homogenous of degree zero in fI t ; K t g.
Proof. See Appendix I.
Equivalence
If we de…ne the market value of one unit of newly installed capital (or Tobin's Q) of a …rm as
using equation (19) , we can simplify the implicit function O(" t ) in equation (18) as
Therefore, using the de…ned functions for f'( ); ' 0 ( ); O( ); Qg, the system of equations that solve for aggregate investment rate (i t ), the capital stock (K t+1 ), and Q t are given by
Now consider a standard representative-agent macro model of CAC (e.g., Hayashi, 1982) , where a representative-…rm solves (taking as given the marginal product of capital R t )
subject to
De…ne Q t (Tobin's Q) as the Lagrangian multiplier for the constraint (29) and i t It Kt as the investment rate, the …rst-order conditions for fI t ; K t+1 g are given, respectively, by
Using equation (30), we can rewrite equation (31) as
Notice that the system of equations (29), (30) , and (32) are identical to the system of equations (25)- (27) if the two CAC functions, '( ) and ( ), are identical. Since the equivalence between our micro-founded model and the aggregate CAC model holds regardless of the value of~ in the micro-founded model, the equivalence result is established without relying on the assumption of irreversible investment. The key assumption for the equivalence is the collateralized borrowing constraint (8) .
The equivalence result holds regardless of the exogenous driving processes of fR t ; W t ; t g.
That is, the two models are identical not only in the steady state but also along any transitional dynamic path. For example, the impulse responses of the two models are completely identical under either aggregate technology shocks that a¤ect fR t ; W t g or aggregate demand
shocks that a¤ect t .
Example To further illustrate the equivalence result, suppose the distribution of " is Pareto with support [1; 1) and shape parameter > 1, namely, (") = 1 " ; and assume that investment is completely irreversible,~ = 0. With these assumptions, equations (19) and (20) become, respectively,
, which is homogeneous of degree zero and satis…es ' 0 ( It Kt )Q t = 1. Substituting out " t , equation (32) then becomes Q t = E t t+1
; and the law of capital accumulation becomes
which is identical to equation (3) and has the familiar Cobb-Douglas form commonly assumed in the macro literature.
Intuition
In representative-agent CAC models, capital adjustment costs imply that aggregate investment rate is sluggish in responding to macroeconomic environmental changes because of diminishing returns to investment in capital formation. In other words, because ( ) is concave, aggregate investment responds to a higher future capital productivity (R t+1 ) less elastically than it would be otherwise. As a result, the optimal capital stock can only be reached through multiple periods of investment at a …nite speed instead of through a singleperiod investment at a in…nite speed.
In our heterogeneous-agent model, …rm-level investment is lumpy because a …rm undertakes either a large amount of positive investment (called "active" …rms) or a large amount of negative investment (called "inactive" …rms), depending on the idiosyncratic shock to the rate of return to investment in a particular period. However, despite the lumpiness of …rm-level investment, aggregate investment is sluggish. Aggregate investment in our model has two margins, an intensive margin that depends on each …rm's maximum investment level ( ) and an extensive margin that depends on the number of active …rms (" t ) in a period.
Equation (19) shows that the aggregate investment rate depends on (the intensive margin) and the proportion of active …rms, 1 (" ) = Pr [" " ] (the extensive margin, assuming = 0 for a moment). However, the extensive margin is determined by the optimal cuto¤ " t , which behaves sluggishly because by equation (17) Yet at the aggregate level, total investment depends positively and fully on Q for the following reasons: Since a …rm's investment is constrained by the …rm's capital stock, only a fraction of …rms (i.e., the most e¢ cient …rms) will undertake positive investment and the rest of …rms remain inactive in each period. Thus, an increase in the aggregate stock of capital requires a greater proportion of active …rms. This is possible in equilibrium only if the market value of capital (Q) increases (or the cuto¤ " decreases) so that more …rms (including the less e¢ cient ones) also …nd investment pro…table. In other words, the less e¢ cient …rms raise the aggregate marginal cost of investment, hence calling for a higher Q to balance it in equilibrium. Therefore, aggregate investment has a close relationship to Q.
This explains why empirical work based on micro data will tend to …nd …rms'cash ‡ows more important than Q in determining the rate of …rm investment in the short run, but aggregate data and long-run analysis will tend to …nd Q important and signi…cant in determining aggregate investment (see, e.g., Caballero, 1999; Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006).
Endogenous Borrowing Constraints
In the benchmark model, the borrowing limit is assumed to be a …xed proportion of the existing capital stock. In general, …rms'borrowing limits may depend on the value of the collateral (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1998). That is, the parameter may be endogenous. To relax this assumption, consider the following borrowing constraint with endogenous credit limits:
where Q t (i) denotes the market value of …rm i's existing capital stock and > 0 is a parameter.
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Proposition 2 Assuming~ = 0 for simplicity (without loss of generality), the optimal investment and capital accumulation policies of a …rm are given by
The value function of a …rm per unit of capital (v t (i)) is given by
Proof. See Appendix II.
Hence, the decision rules take exactly the same form as those in the benchmark model (except here the parameter in the benchmark model is replaced by Q t ). Note that the market value of …rm i's existing capital stock and the marginal value of one unit of newly installed capital are the same across …rms (i.e., independent of i), as in the benchmark model. That is, Q t (i) = Q t and all …rms have the same Tobin's Q from the perspective of the markets.
11 10 For example, if the non-depreciated capital stock is fully collateralized, then = 1 . 11 As mentioned earlier in the previous section, because markets are incomplete in the model, idiosyncratic shocks to a …rm's investment return are uninsured. Hence, q t (i) = "t(i) " t cannot be used by the market to determine a …rm's Q. This is why the market-based measure of Q is
By the law of large numbers, the aggregate investment is given by
Since Q t = 1 " t , the above equation de…nes the implicit function Q t = Q (I t =K t ). We can use this implicit equation to rewrite equation (36) as
Similarly, the aggregate law of motion for capital accumulation is given by
Proposition 3 For any probability density function (") that satis…es 0 (") 0, the implicit function ( ) in equation (40) is increasing, concave, and homogenous of degree zero in fI t ; K t g.
Proof. See Appendix III.
Example Many standard distributions, such as Pareto, Exponential, and Uniform distribution, satisfy the property 0 (") 0. As an example, consider Pareto distribution, (") = 1 " with > 1. Equation (38) becomes Therefore, we have shown that borrowing constraints at the …rm level can fully rationalize the CAC function (1). In other words, the speci…c form aggregate capital adjustment costs assumed by Hayashi (1982) and others in the existing literature can be derived from microfoundations with …nancial frictions that hinder …rms'ability to borrow. However, there exist subtle but important di¤erences between the exogenous borrowing limit model and the endogenous borrowing limit model, as shown below.
Non-Equivalence
With an endogenous borrowing limit, the equivalence between the microfounded heterogeneous…rm model and the representative-agent CAC model holds only so long as equation (1) The source of the discrepancy stems from the endogeneity of the borrowing constraints in equation (34) , where the market value of capital, Q(I t =K t ), is positively a¤ected by the rate of aggregate investment. Hence, the more investment each …rm undertakes, the higher is the value of a …rm, and thus the more creditworthy each …rm becomes. However, this type of credit externality is not internalized by …rms because Q is an aggregate market price taken as given by individual …rms. As a result, the micro-founded model appears to have an insu¢ cient investment level relative to the counterpart representative-agent CAC model.
The following proposition shows that the credit externality in the endogenous borrowing limit model is equivalent to an aggregate "investment externality" in a conventional CAC model, where the source of the aggregate investment externality is a social rate of return to the average investment that individual …rms take as given.
Proposition 4
The heterogenous-…rm model with an endogenous borrowing limit is obser-vationally equivalent to the following representative-…rm CAC model with investment externalities:
where { t It Kt denotes the average investment-to-capital ratio in the economy that the representative …rm takes as given, and the CAC function~ ( ; ) is increasing and concave in f { t ; i t g and satis…es the decomposition:~ ( { t ; i t ) = Q( { t )'(i t ), where the function '( ) satis…es
Proof. See Appendix IV.
Example As an example, consider the microfounded model with Pareto distribution. The model's equilibrium is characterized by equations (42), (43), and (44). Now consider a representative-…rm CAC model with investment externality
and
It Kt denotes the average investment rate in the economy that the representative …rm takes as given. Denoting Q t as the Lagrangian multiplier for the constraint. The …rst order conditions with respect I t and K t+1 are given, respectively, by
Imposing the equilibrium condition,
, and plugging in the values of f' 0 ; a; bg, equation (48) becomes
equation (49) becomes
and equation (50) changes to
The above three equations are identical to equations (42) though (44) in the microfounded model.
Policy Implications
The above analysis suggests the perils of relying on the apparent equivalence in the CAC function to rationalize capital adjustment cost models. In particular, the endogenous credit limit model reveals that the assumption of aggregate CAC is subject to the Lucas critique because parameters in the CAC function are not structural and policy-invariant. As an example for the di¤erent policy implications between the two models, we have the following
Proposition 5
The optimal steady-state capital tax rate in the representative-agent CAC model is zero while it is negative in the endogenous credit limit model.
Proof. See Appendix V.
The intuition behind this proposition is simple. The endogenous credit limit model features a positive credit externality on …rm's investment. Because …rms take the borrowing limit as exogenous while it is endogenously determined by the market equilibrium, the competitive equilibrium features suboptimal investment and leads to insu¢ cient capital stock.
Alternatively, since the model is equivalent to an representative-agent CAC model with positive investment externalities, the investment level determined by a representative …rm in a competitive equilibrium is lower than optimal. Therefore, a negative capital tax rate to encourage more investment improves social welfare.
Tobin' s Q and Firm-Level Investment
This section solves for a general-equilibrium version of our microfounded investment model and use simulated data from the model to investigate relationship between …rm-level investment and Tobin's Q. Since a …rm's investment rate depends on the …rm value and other macro economic variables such as the real wage, a general-equilibrium model is required.
A representative consumer (owner of …rms) solves
where t denotes lump-sum pro…t income from all …rms. Notice that, for simplicity, the household does not save. If we introduce an equity market where households can buy …rms'
shares, the results would be identical. Denoting t as the Lagrange multiplier of the household's budget constraint, the …rst-order conditions of the representative household are given
The problem of the …rm is identical to that in the previous section with endogenous borrowing limits. Namely, …rms'decision rules are given by equations (35) through (37) , and the following relationships hold:
Yt Nt
, and R t =
Yt Kt
. Under the assumption of Pareto distribution, the competitive general equilibrium of the aggregate economy is characterized by these three relationships, plus equations (42), (43), (44), (56), and (57). This system of 8 equations determines the equilibrium path of
The equilibrium cuto¤ is determined by " t = Q 1 t . It can be easily con…rmed by the eigenvalue method that the model has a unique saddle-path steady state near the steady state. We solve the model by log-linearization around the steady state under the assumption that the aggregate productivity (A t ) evolves according to the law of motion,
where t is i.i.d. with standard deviation normalized to 1.
Calibration. We calibrate the model at a quarterly frequency by setting the time discounting factor = 0:99, the capital's income share = 0:3, the persistence of technology shock = 0:98, and the standard deviation of innovation = 0:0072 (as in standard RBC literature). Since a L does not enter the model's log-linear dynamic system, we choose a L such that N = 1 in the deterministic steady state. The other three parameters, namely, the depreciation rate of capital , the borrowing limit , and the Pareto distribution parameter , are chosen so that the model matches the distribution of …rm-level investment. The parameter values are summarized in Table 1 . 
as a …rm's investment rate. The annual investment rate in the model is calculated by simulation and time aggregation. We simulate 200; 000 quarters of data. We …rst use a general equilibrium model to obtain the cuto¤ " t ; we then draw 200; 000 independent draw of " t (i) for a typical …rm by normalizing its initial capital stock. We then calculate the annual investment rate for = 1; 2; :::50; 000 by
(More details of the simulation procedure can be found in Appendix VI). The statistics for the annualized investment rate i A t are reported in Table 2 , where the empirical counterpart are based on statistics reported by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006, p. 615, Table 1 ). The table shows that our microfounded model is able to match the basic features of …rm-level investment dynamics reported by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) . For example, out model predicts that (i) In any given year, about 18% of …rms are inactive (making zero or negative investment), about 19% of …rms undertake big investment projects (with values exceeding 20 percent of the existing capital stock), and the average investment rate is about 12% a year. These predictions match the data almost exactly. (ii) The standard deviation of investment rate is 32% whereas it is 34% in the data. (iii) Firm-level investment is not serially correlated. The model predicts an autocorrelation of 0:0047 while this value is 0:058 in the data. Therefore, our model does a very good job in explaining the lumpiness and lack of serial correlations in …rm's investment behavior.
Another well-known empirical puzzle is that …rm-level investment is not sensitive to Tobin's Q but standard CAC models predicts that Tobin's Q is a su¢ cient statistic to determine …rms' investment rate. To test if our model provides a plausible resolution to this puzzle, we run regressions for both …rm-level investment rate on Q t (Tobin's Q) for two models, one for our microfounded model and another for the representative-…rm CAC model.
The regression has a constant as an independent variable. We report R 2 of the regressions.
If Tobin's Q is a su¢ cient statistic for investment, the value of R 2 should be 1; if not, the value should be far less than 1. The table shows that in both models, investment rate depends positively on Q t . However, in the conventional CAC model Q t is a su¢ cient statistic for investment because the R 2 = 1; whereas in our model Q t has very little explanatory power on investment-the R 2 is close to zero, as has been noticed by the large existing empirical literature.
Conclusion
The popular assumption of CAC in DSGE models is consistent with aggregate investment behaviors but inconsistent with micro evidence. This paper tempts to provide microfoundations to rationalize CAC through …nancial frictions. In particular, we show that collateralized borrowing due to contract enforcement problem at the …rm level can generate lumpy investment at the …rm level and CAC functions at the aggregate level. Therefore, we provide a justi…cation for the large dynamic macro literature that assumes CAC. However, we also point out the potential perils in assuming aggregate CAC in DSGE models: CAC may be subject to the Lucas critique because the parameters in CAC functions are not necessarily policy invariant. Consequently, policy analysis based on CAC models may be invalid and
misleading. An example of optimal capital tax is given in this paper to illustrate this point.
We believe that the analysis also applies to optimal monetary policies. For example, the new Keynesian sticky-price literature often assumes CAC to better match the aggregate data. In such models, optimal monetary policies often face trade-o¤s between output gap and in ‡ation. However, if CAC arises from endogenous borrowing constraints and money supply a¤ects banks'lending policies and credit availability, optimal monetary policy may put more weight on output gap relative to in ‡ation than it would otherwise in a CAC model. These issues are worth further studies.
Appendix I. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Denoting i t
It Kt
and taking derivative of the function '( ) in equation (22) with
where (") denotes the PDF of ". Di¤erentiating equation (19) with respect to i t
, we
The above two equations together imply
Di¤erentiating this equation with respect to i t again and using equation (61) gives
Therefore, the function '(i t ) is increasing and strictly concave in i t . Since '(i t ) depends only on the investment to capital ratio, it is homogenous of degree zero in fI t ; K t g.
Appendix II. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Denote V [K t (i); " t (i)] as the value function of …rm i with capital stock K t (i). Based on the analysis of Hayashi (1982) , we conjecture that a …rm's value is linearly homogeneous in its capital stock because of constant returns to scale production technology:
We will verify later that this conjecture is correct. De…ne v t Ev t (i) = Z v t (")d (") as the average value of the …rm across states and i t (i)
as the …rm's investment rate. Firm i solves the following dynamic programing problem,
and the borrowing constraint in equation (34) . To simplify the analysis, assume~ = 0.
Denote f t (i); t (i); t (i)g as the Lagrangian multipliers of constraints (66), (67), and (34), respectively, the …rm's …rst order conditions for {I t (i); K t+1 (i)} are given, respectively,
The envelop condition is given by v t (i) = R t + (1 ) t (i) + Q t (i) t (i). Substituting this expression into equation (68) gives
Hence, the …rst-order conditions are all the same as those in the benchmark model except here we have = (1 ) Q t (i). Therefore, following the same steps of analysis as in the benchmark model (Section 2.2) by considering di¤erent cases for the possible values of the Lagrangian multipliers, it can be easily shown that the Lagrangian multipliers are given by t (i) = max fq t (i) 1; 0g, t (i) = max f1 q t (i); 0g, where q t (i) = "t(i) " t ; and the …rm's optimal decision rules for investment and capital accumulation are given by equations (35) and (36) , and the …rm's value function is given by equation (37) . Clearly, since R t and Q t are independent of K t (i), equation (37) implies that the value of a …rm is proportional to its capital stock:
. This con…rms our initial conjecture.
Appendix III. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Denote i t
It Kt
, then
Since
where the inequality holds because
d (") > 1 (" ) and the support of " is in the positive region of the real line.
Integration by parts and rearranging, the …rst term in the numerator of 0 (i) can be written as
Notice that
Clearly, so long as 0 (" t ) 0, we have
and 00
since @" t @it < 0 by equation (38). Therefore, ( ) is increasing and concave. In addition, it is clear that ( ) depends only on the investment to capital ratio i t , so it is homogenous of degree zero in fI; Kg.
Appendix IV. Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Consider a representative …rm solving the program in equation (28) subject to equation (45), taking { t as given. Denoting Q t as the Lagrangian multiplier for the constraint and imposing the equilibrium condition { t = i t , the …rst order condition for I t and K t+1 are given, respectively, by
Since (78) can be written as
which is identical to equation (39) in the microfounded model.
Appendix V. Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The …rst part of the proposition-the optimal capital tax rate in the representativeagent CAC model without externalities is optimal-is a standard result in the literature.
Hence, we only need to prove the second part of the proposition. We add a representative household into the model so the government's objective function is well-de…ned. We prove the proposition in an environment without aggregate uncertainty. The household's problem is to choose consumption (C t ) and labor supply (N t ) in each period to solve
subject to C t w t N t + t + T t , where t denotes aggregate dividend distributed from …rms and
di is a lump sum transfer from the government based on capital tax revenues collected from all …rm i, where t is the tax rate for capital income.
The …rst-order conditions of the household can be summarized by
On the …rm side, we can show that, regardless of capital tax, the endogenous credit limit model is always equivalent to a representative-…rm model with investment externality.
Hence, based on the equivalence, we only need to prove that the optimal capital tax rate is negative in the representative-…rm model with investment externality. For simplicity, we consider Pareto distribution for …rms' idiosyncratic shocks " t (i) (in the microfounded model) and Cobb-Douglas production function,
. Thus, the equivalent CAC function is a Cobb-Douglas form and the problem of a representative …rm in the investment externality model is to solve
where a =
( +1)
, b = 1 , and
It Kt denotes the average investment rate in the economy that each …rm takes as given. The …rst order conditions for fI t ; K t+1 g in this model are given by 
, and plugging in the values of f' 0 ; a; bg, and substituting out fR t ; w t ; Q t g, the above two …rst-order conditions become
The law of motion for capital accumulation becomes
and the household resource constraint becomes
Notice that equations (81), (87), (88), (89), and the aggregate production function can uniquely pin down the competitive equilibrium path of fC t ; I t ; Y t ; N t ; K t+1 g as a function of the tax rate t in the externality model. The optimal tax policy is to design a sequence of tax rates f t g 1 t=0 to solve
subject to equations 81, (87), (88), (89), and the aggregate production function.
Instead of directly solving program (90), we …rst study the "…rst best allocation" in the externality model, which pertains to the highest possible utility that a social planner can achieve in the model when the investment externality is fully endogenized. Hence, the …rst best allocation also pertains to the highest possible utility that the government can achieve using tax policies in program (90).
The …rst best allocation solves
It is obvious that the lifetime utility de…ned in program (91) is at least as large as that de…ned in program (90): V (K 0 ) V (K 0 ), because the former gives the …rst best allocation. The …rst-order conditions for fI t ; C t ; K t+1 g in program (91) are given, respectively, by
The …rst equation above implies Q t = 
Notice that equations (95), (97), (92), (93), and the aggregate production function together uniquely solve for the …rst best allocation fC t ; I t ; Y t ; N t ; K t+1 g under program (91).
Similarly, equations (81), (87), (88), (89), and the aggregate production function together uniquely solve for the equilibrium path of fC( t ); I( t ); Y ( t ); N ( t ); K( t )g in a competitive equilibrium with investment externalities. Comparing these two system of equations, except that equation (97) I t+1 K t+1 1 +1
Simpli…cation gives
Since Q t = 
This equation implies that in the steady state we must have Y > I . Then by equation
(99), we must have < 0 in the steady state to achieve the …rst best allocation.
Appendix VI. Model Simulation 1) Simulating aggregate variables.
We solve the equilibrium path of the aggregate variables by log-linear approximation around the deterministic steady state. The log-linearized variable is de…ned aŝ x t log(X t ) log X;
where X indicates steady-state value. We simulate the aggregate model for t = 200; 000 periods using the law of motion of aggregate technology in equation (58). Based on the simulated variables, we can use the following transformation to obtain
In this way, we obtain the sequences of capital K t ; aggregate investment I t , Tobin's Q t , and the cuto¤ " t = 1 Qt .
2) Generating …rm data. To do so we need to simulate the idiosyncratic shocks, " t (i). A random sample with 200; 000 observations for "(i) in each time period t can be generated using inverse transform sampling. Given a random variable U drawn from the uniform distribution on the unit interval (0; 1), the variate
is Pareto-distributed with the distribution function
Given the sequences of aggregate variables (especially the cuto¤ " t ), we obtain …rm-level investment based on the …rm's decision rule,
We normalize each …rm's initial capital stock to the aggregate steady-state capital K; namely, K 0 (i) = K. We construct the …rm-level capital sequence by the law of motion:
In each time period t = 0; 1; :::; 200; 000, we track each …rm i's capital stock and positive investment level whenever " t (i) " t .
3) Regression analysis.
We run two regressions. The …rst is based on aggregate time series:
The second is based on …rm-level data:
The adjusted R 2 is almost the same if we used logged variables for the aggregate model. For the …rm-level data, since
can be zero in some periods, we can not use logged values in the regression.
